不完全信息下讨价还价博弈及买方获益模型分析

Bargaining under Incomplete Information Game and Analysis of the Buyer’s Benefiting Model

摘要

摘要:将在较为贴近现实的假设前提下，构造一个双边不完全信息下的讨价还价博弈过程，并分析其应满足的条件，最终得出买方获益模型，并加以分析得出买方获益的因素，解释了买方的获益与其购买数量和还价能力的关系.

Abstract:This paper, under the assumption close to reality, constructs a game of bargaining in which both the seller and buyer don’t have complete information. And by analyzing the conditions which are required in the bargaining, the buyer’s benefiting model takes shape. And it can well interpret the relations between the buyer’s benefits and the number of goods he or she can buy and his or her bargaining ability.